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Abstract 
Trend (potential) GDP estimates, and consequently output gaps, a key variable 
for calculating cyclically adjusted balances (CABs), are unobservable and 
depend on past and projected observations. Thus, revisions to output forecasts 
lead to changes in CAB estimates, even if no additional discretionary measures 
have been taken. This paper presents an analysis of the impact of revisions to 
economic growth projections on the levels of and changes in structural balances 
when the Hodrick-Prescott filter is used to estimate the output gap. Two main 
conclusions are obtained. Firstly, economic growth revisions affect both the 
output trend and output gap, and thus CABs, to a degree that depends on 
whether the revisions have a temporary or permanent effect on the GDP level. 
Transitory changes in the level of output are mainly allocated to the cyclical 
component and CAB levels are little affected. If, however, the revision implies a 
permanent change in GDP level, CABs will be affected to a larger extent. 
Secondly, it is also shown that the impact of economic growth revisions on CAB 
changes is much more limited than on CAB levels. Given that the change in 
structural balances due to GDP revisions cannot be attributed to fiscal policy 
actions and that it can be easily calculated, we argue that this factor should be 
recognised when judging the ex-post compliance of EU countries with the rules 
of the Stability Pact. 
71. Introduction 
Observed budget balances are an imperfect indicator of the fiscal policy stance. 
Among other factors, this is due to the endogeneity of the budget balance in relation to 
the economy's cyclical position. That is to say, at times of economic expansion 
(recession), public revenue tends to grow (diminish) and public spending fall (increase) 
merely as a result of the workings of the built-in stabilisers. The budget balance is 
therefore affected, without the government necessarily having taken any discretionary 
action. This prevents any a priori assessment of whether a change in the actual 
government balance can be ascribed to economic conditions or to discretionary 
measures undertaken by fiscal authorities.  
Thus there is a need for instruments to distinguish between the respective 
impacts of both the economic cycle and discretionary actions on observed balances. 
Currently, various indicators quantify this cyclically-adjusted balance (CAB), subtracting 
from the budget balance the portion thereof which is estimated to be due to cyclical 
factors. The basis of all these indicators is the choice of a theoretical reference 
framework given by potential or trend GDP. The indicators estimate the cyclical 
component of the budgetary balance by applying the output gap elasticities of public 
revenue and spending. 
Cyclically adjusted budget balances are routinely used by the OECD, the 
European Commission and the IMF in their fiscal analyses. However, their relevance 
and necessity has been reinforced within the EU boundaries by the multilateral 
surveillance procedures in force since the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) became 
effective. The SGP establishes a medium-term objective of budgetary positions 
close-to-balance or in surplus (CTBS). This medium-term goal aims at allowing Member 
States to deal with normal cyclical fluctuations while keeping the government deficit 
below the 3% of GDP ceiling established by the Treaty of Maastricht. In this regard, CAB 
levels constitute the main tool for monitoring and assessing compliance with the CTBS 
medium-term goal, since this clause is interpreted as a requirement to approximately 
balance either observed budget outcomes on average over the full length of the 
business cycle or, alternatively, cyclically-adjusted balances (CABs) every period. In 
addition, changes in CABs also now feature more prominently in the monitoring of fiscal 
developments, since the 2003 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) required 
those Member States failing to comply with the CTBS clause to improve their CABs by 
at least 0.5% of GDP each year. 
Despite their usefulness, the calculation of CABs is not problem-free and, in fact, 
there is a considerable debate about the reliability of real-time CAB estimates and their 
relevance for policy decision-making and the assessment of medium-term fiscal 
objectives of EU Member States. These problems have been highlighted by the current 
economic conditions. 
Specifically, the economic performance in most euro area countries has recently 
been characterised by sluggish economic growth, which has repeatedly fallen short of 
expectations, leading to several successive downward revisions of GDP growth 
projections for the current and coming years. General government budget balances are 
also experiencing a considerable deterioration in some euro area countries and, as a 
result, some Member States might fail to comply with the recommendations in the 2003 
BEPG. In this context, downward revisions to GDP growth in different European 
countries are usually interpreted as a purely cyclical phenomenon. If this were the case, 
in the absence of discretionary policies, the deterioration of nominal budget balances 
would reflect cyclical factors, while structural balances or CABs should not be affected. 
However, the opposite seems to be the case; revisions to economic growth projections 
seem to have an impact on estimated structural balances leading to deviations of budget 
balances, in cyclically-adjusted terms, from those planned (or forecasted). 
The problem mainly lies in the uncertainty of real-time output gap estimates. 
Trend (potential) GDP estimates, and consequently output gaps, a key variable for 
calculating CABs, are unobservable and depend on past and projected GDP 
observations. A revision to GDP forecasts will consequently lead to a change in CAB 
estimates, even if no additional discretionary measures have been taken. This problem 
seems to be shared by the alternative methodologies for estimating output gaps, since it 
is the arrival of new information that creates the problem. 
The aim of this paper is to analyse and discuss the relevance of this issue in the 
context of the regular assessment of public finances in the euro area countries. To do 
so, the next section illustrates the impact of revisions to economic growth projections on 
CAB levels and changes when the Hodrick-Prescott filter is used to estimate the output 
gap. In Section 3 we estimate the impact of GDP revisions on structural balances in the 
euro area countries using the last revisions of GDP data and projections from the 
European Commission. Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
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92. Impact of revisions to economic growth projections on structural public 
balances (CABs) 
2.1. A methodology for calculating CABs 
The structural balance (or cyclically-adjusted balance, CAB) at time t ( *tb ) is the 
difference between the observed budget balance (bt) and its cyclical component ( ctb ):
)( ** ttt
c
ttt yybbbb ????? ?      (1) 
where bt, *tb , ctb  are expressed as a proportion of nominal GDP and the cyclical 
component ( ctb ) is calculated as the product of the overall cyclical sensitivity of the 
budget balance (?) and the output gap or deviation of real GDP (in logs), yt, from its 
trend *ty
1.
There are many approaches for estimating the output gap which might lead to 
very different results [see Canova (1998)] and whose various advantages have been 
debated at length in the economic literature. For the purpose of calculating CABs, the 
European Commission (EC) follows a production function2 approach for most countries, 
although the Hodrick-Prescott filter is also employed as an additional reference3. In 
order to facilitate the country comparisons and to make the problem more tractable we 
only use the Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP filter, hereafter). The discussion of the 
alternative methodologies, although relevant, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The HP filter, originally proposed by Hodrick and Prescott (1980), decomposes 
the observed real output, y=(y1, …, yT)’ into a trend y*=( )....,, **1 Tyy ’ and a cyclical 
component c=(c1, …, cT)’:
ttt cyy ??
*  for  t=1, 2, …, T   (2)
by minimizing the loss function: 
                                               
1 There are alternative approaches for calculating CABs. For instance, cyclical components could be 
calculated separately for the different expenditure and revenue categories and then added [see for example 
Bouthevillain et al (2001) or Larch and Salto (2003)].  
2 See Denis et al. (2002) for a description. 
3 In particular, for those countries in which the production function approach provides not yet very reliable 
results (Spain, Germany and Austria), the HP filter is employed in the Commission's assessment of fiscal 
policy developments. In the case of Luxembourg no CABs are calculated by the Commission. 
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where the first term in (3) penalizes large cyclical components (i.e., poor fit), while the 
second term penalizes lack of smoothness in the trend. The parameter ?, chosen a 
priori, regulates the trade-off between the two criteria so that the larger the value of ? the 
smoother the trend. The solution is given by the expression: 
yCy ?*        (4) 
where ? ? 1' ??? KKIC ? , and K  is a (T-2)xT matrix with elements Kij=1 if i=j or i=j+2,
Kij=-2 if i=j+1, and Kij=0 otherwise. Therefore, the trend series yt* is a moving average of 
all elements in the original GDP series yt. The TxT matrix of weights, C, depends on the 
sample size T and on the parameter ?. In the calculation of yt* for any given t, the largest 
weight is assigned to the contemporaneous observation of yt, with the weights for yt-i
and yt+i declining when i increases. 
The HP filter is a widely used method for estimating output gaps. It only requires 
the specification of the ? parameter, which, as mentioned above, tunes the smoothness 
of the trend. Its a priori choice should depend on the frequency of the data and on the 
main period of the cycle of interest to the analyst. However, the HP filter has also 
received substantial criticism, among other reasons, due to its poor performance at the 
end of the sample. This drawback is mainly a problem of limited information, because 
the estimation of real-time output gaps requires assumptions on current and future 
economic performance, and hence, it is the uncertainty of these projections that mainly 
drives the revisions to CABs. Alternative estimation approaches tend to share a similar 
problem [see, for example Orphanides and van Norden (2002)] although the size and 
duration of the revision might differ across them. In fact Rünstler (2002) estimates the 
output gap for euro area countries and shows that the uncertainty is sharply reduced in 
multivariate models. 
At the end of the sample a proper estimation of yt* with the HP filter requires 
future observations to preserve the two-sided feature of the filter. Since these 
observations are not available, in practice the application of the filter is sometimes 
truncated. Then as new observations arise for period T+1, T+2,… the estimation of yT* is 
subsequently revised. Kaiser and Maravall (2001) analyse this empirical problem of the 
HP filter and show that the end-point problem could be partly solved by extending the 
time series with ARIMA forecasts. Moreover, they show that only four forecasts are 
needed to reproduce exactly the effect of the infinite forecast extension. Then any 
revision to the estimation of yT* will not be the result of an incomplete application or 
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truncation of the filter, but of the revision to the forecasts. Hence, the choice as to how to 
extend the series is a key decision for minimising the forecast errors in the estimation of 
the trend component near the end of the sample. 
2.2. Impact of revisions to economic growth projections on structural public 
balances with the HP filter 
Let us define ? as the revision operator, i.e. the difference in the value of a 
variable for a particular period at two different points in time (let us say for example 
between two projection exercises). Then, from (1), the revision to the structural fiscal 
balance for period t can be expressed as: 
?????? cttt bbb
* ? ?*ttt yyb ???? ?    (5) 
If there is no change in the trend GDP (y*) when the new GDP projections are 
available, then the revision to the output gap will be exactly the same as that to GDP 
? ?*tt yy ?? = ty?  and the revision to the structural balance will be zero ( *tb? =0), if no 
new discretionary measures are in place. If, on the contrary, the revision to GDP leads 
to a change in both the trend GDP and the output gap, there will be a revision to the 
CAB which is due to the revision to trend GDP and not to discretionary measures. Thus, 
the term *y??  can be seen as the part of the change in the CAB due to the revision to 
trend GDP and will be referred as the Data Revision Component (DRC hereafter). The 
change in the CAB not explained by the data revision can then be obtained by the 
difference yb ????  and will include the effect of discretionary measures or temporary 
effects (explained or unexplained).
By definition, the DRC will arise when new GDP projections are released, 
independently of any endogenous or exogenous force affecting the budget balance 
projections. In addition, even if the GDP change only affects a single year, its impact will 
show up on the whole trend GDP series and, consequently, on the whole CAB series 
(even if its size will tend to be negligible for years far away from the one for which the 
revision takes place). 
Let us assume that at a given point in time during year T0, the whole yt annual
series is known up to T0 -1. We also assume that economic forecasts are available for 
T0, T0+1, T0+2. This is the type of information available, for instance, for the Autumn 
Forecasts of the European Commission carried out in year T0. Moreover we assume that 
the series is extended until the period T0+6. We will denote this available set of 
information by the superscript ’a’. And from (4), we can express each element of y* as a 
moving average of past and future elements of y:
?
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During the year T0, new GDP forecasts become available (for instance, the 
Autumn Forecasts of the EC). We assume that the revision only affects the values of yt
in T0, T0+1,…or T0+6, that is, past values of the series are not revised, but only the 
current year value, the forecasts for the next couple of years and, possibly, even the 
extended values. Denoting the new set of information by ’b’, new estimates of the 
output trend are obtained: 
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Subtracting (6) from (7), the revision (in percentage points) to the trend level in t 
is: 
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And taking into account that at
b
t yy ? for t=1, 2 …, T0-1, then 
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which provides the percentage change in the level of the output trend for each period as 
a function of the percentage change in observed GDP from T0 to T. Then, applying the 
cyclical sensitivity of the budget balance to (9) one obtains the DRC at time t.
DRCt= ? ??
?
??????
T
Tj
a
j
b
jjt
a
t
b
t yyyy
0
,
** c)(
In order to illustrate the practical implications, let us consider an example where 
the new forecast revises downwards the GDP growth for year T0 by 1%. We consider 
two cases. In the first case, the growth rates for the subsequent periods remain 
unchanged, that is to say the revision implies a permanent change in the level of GDP. 
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In the second, the growth rate for T0+1 is also revised –in this case, upwards– by the 
same amount of 1%, which means that the whole effect of the revision is of a temporary 
nature. As will be discussed later, comparing these two cases is meant to shed some 
light on the implications of the revision to the GDP trend series associated with the 
revision to the original series. 
CASE 1: PERMANENT REVISION TO GDP LEVEL
Let us assume that 01.0
00
?? aT
b
T gg  and 
a
t
b
t gg ?  for t=T0+1, T0+2,…,T, where 
i
tg
denotes the observed GDP growth rate for year t in forecasting exercise i.
This revision of the series implies a permanent change in the level of the original 
GDP series, yt, from t=T0 onwards. More formally, the level of GDP at T0 under each 
forecasting exercise can be related to the level of GDP in the preceding year as follows: 
? ?bTTbT gYY 000 11 ?? ?       (10)
? ?aTTaT gYY 000 11 ?? ?       (11)
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It can be easily seen that, for the following periods, the percentage change in the 
level of GDP has the same magnitude: 
, T2,1, T Ttyy 00
a
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Substituting (12) and (13) into (9): 
?
?
???
T
Tj
jt
a
t
b
t cyy
0
01.0,
**      (14) 
As mentioned earlier, the precise form of the coefficients ci,,j is dependent on the 
sample size T and the HP filter parameter ?. In order to make the example operational 
we assume T=30 (which could correspond, for instance, to the period from 1980 
to 2009), ?=30 and To=24 (corresponding to year 2003, given the previous choice for T) 4.
For these baseline values, Chart 1 shows the revision to observed GDP and the implied 
revisions to the trend and cyclical components of GDP. 
CHART 1. Revisions to actual GDP, trend GDP and cyclical component. 
Case 1 with baseline values: T=30, ?=30 and To=24.
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The downward revision of GDP growth by 1% for 2003, implies a permanent 
change in the level of the GDP series, maintained until 2009 (T=30), if all other growth 
rates are unchanged. This permanent change in GDP is transmitted to the trend in a 
smooth way. The contemporaneous revision to the trend and cyclical components are, 
respectively, 0.54% and 0.46%. But, for future periods, the revision to the trend 
becomes larger until the full effect is captured only in the trend. In fact, the revision to 
the trend overshoots the revision to observed GDP towards the end of the sample due 
to the truncation of the data. If, given T0, T were larger, the long term revision to the 
trend would converge with the total revision of observed GDP. In the end, the level of 
trend GDP converges with the new (lower) level of observed GDP. The strange pattern 
                                               
4 To be more precise, our assumption for T would correspond to having an observed GDP sample from 
1980 to 2002, projections for 2003 to 2005 and forecasts up to 2009 to avoid the end-sample problem. As 
far as ? is concerned, a value of 30 is initially used, as proposed by Bouthevillain et al (2001) but alternative 
values, such as that employed by the European Commission (?=100), are also considered for a sensitivity 
analysis. 
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of the revision to the cyclical component, as a result of the jump in the revision of GDP 
and the smooth revision to the trend component, is remarkable. 
The DRC or the adjustment to the CAB due to the revision to data, is the result of 
multiplying the revision to the trend by the cyclical sensitivity of the budget balance  
which is assumed to take the value 0.45. As can be seen in Chart 2, this revision to the 
trend is negligible until around 1999 (that is, T0 - 4) and increases from then onwards to 
reach -0.2 and -0.5 percentage points by 2003 (T0) and 2009 (T= T0+6), respectively. 
Consequently, after a fairly small assumed revision to observed GDP for a single year 
(1% less growth at T0=2003), the estimated CAB changes by several tenths of a 
percentage point in that and the following years. This might give rise, for example, to the 
possibility that a given country which under the previous set of forecasts was deemed to 
be on a "close-to-balance" position, no longer being so after the revision to the 
forecasts. 
CHART 2. Effect of data revisions on ‘CAB level’ and ‘CAB changes’. 
Case 1 with baseline values: T=30, ?=30 and To=24.
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
Effect of data revision on 'CAB levels'
Effect of data revision on 'CAB changes'
From a policy point of view, it is relevant to analyse not only the size of the 
revision to the level of the CAB, but also to its change, given the 0.5% of GDP 
adjustment for countries not in CTBS position required by the 2003 BEPGs. Chart 2 
shows the revisions to the levels of the CAB (Data Revision Component, DRC) and to 
                                               
5 The European Commission (2002) provides estimates of budgetary sensitivity to the output gap. They 
range from 0.3 in Austria to 0.7 in Finland. The value 0.4 corresponds to that of Greece, Spain and France. 
the changes in the CAB (change in the DRC) for the given set of assumptions. As can 
be seen the revision to the change in the CAB is smaller and reaches a maximum 
at To = 2003 (whose rounded size would be one tenth of a percentage point). The 
explanation is that, since revisions to GDP growth introduce a change in the level of 
trend GDP in all periods around the revision date, the impact of the new information on 
CAB changes is much smaller than that on CAB levels. 
TABLE 1. Revisions to the level of CABs (DRC): sensitivity analysis 
Year (1) Baseline
(2)
?=100
(3)
T 0 =26
(4)
T =40
(5)  Downward 
revision of GDP 
growth by 2% in T o
(6)   Downward 
revision of GDP 
growth by 1% in T 0
and T 0 +1
1980-86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1987 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1988 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1989 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1990 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
1991 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
1992 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01
1993 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02
1994 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02
1995 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03
1996 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
1997 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02
1998 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.04 -0.02 0.00
1999 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 -0.04
2000 -0.06 -0.09 -0.06 -0.06 -0.13 -0.09
2001 -0.11 -0.12 -0.10 -0.11 -0.22 -0.17
2002 -0.16 -0.17 -0.16 -0.17 -0.33 -0.27
2003 -0.23 -0.22 -0.22 -0.24 -0.45 -0.39
2004 -0.28 -0.26 -0.29 -0.29 -0.56 -0.51
2005 -0.33 -0.31 -0.35 -0.34 -0.66 -0.61
2006 -0.37 -0.35 -0.40 -0.38 -0.74 -0.71
2007 -0.40 -0.39 -0.46 -0.41 -0.80 -0.78
2008 -0.43 -0.43 -0.43 -0.86 -0.85
2009 -0.45 -0.47 -0.45 -0.91 -0.92
Note: Scenario 3 includes only four periods after T0. However, since T=30, this means that the 
sample starts two years earlier. Scenario 4 includes ten new observations at the beginning 
of the sample.
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Finally, the sensitivity of the results to the baseline values of the assumptions is 
presented in Table 1. The baseline (column 1) assumes: T=30, T0=24, ?=30,
%1
00
??? aT
b
T gg . Columns 2, 3 and 4 show, alternatively, the results when ?=100,
T0=26 and T=40, everything else being kept equal to the baseline. As can be seen, the 
effect of relaxing the original assumptions one at a time is rather small. Column 5 
replaces the baseline hypothesis for the revision to GDP by %2
00
??? aT
b
T gg : doubling 
the size of the revision to GDP doubles the impact on the CAB, which follows from the 
linearity of the revisions to the HP filter. Very similar results are obtained under the 
hypothesis that the revision to observed GDP is such that %1
00
??? aT
b
T gg  and 
%111 00 ??? ??
a
T
b
T gg  (column 6). 
CASE 2: TRANSITORY REVISION TO GDP LEVEL
We now consider a downward revision by 1% in the GDP growth rate for 
period T0 and an upward revision by the same amount in the GDP growth rate for T0+1.
That is to say, the GDP series returns to its original level: 
a
t
b
t
a
T
b
T
a
T
b
T ggandgggg ????? ?? 01.0,01.0 11 0000  for t=T0+2, T0+3,…,T
Following the same reasoning as in Case 1, it can be seen that: 
01.0
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** .?? Tt
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t cyy      (15) 
Chart 3 reports the results for the same baseline assumptions as in Case 1 
(i.e., T=30, T0 =24, ?=30). In this case, the size of the revision to trend GDP is much 
smaller and, what is more relevant, has a transitory nature, as expected. As a result of 
the small size of the revision to trend GDP, the adjustment to CABs due to data revision 
is nearly negligible, being even more so as far as CAB changes are concerned. 
CHART 3. Revisions to actual GDP, trend GDP and the cyclical component. 
Case 2 with baseline values: T=30, ?=30 and To=24.
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3. Estimating the effect of the latest GDP revisions for the euro area 
countries
3.1. The Spanish case: 2002 Spanish Stability Programme versus European 
Commission Spring 2003 forecast 
To illustrate this problem, let us compare first the figures of the 2002 Spanish 
Stability Programme update with those of the European Commission Spring 2003 
forecast (see Table 2). This case is of particular interest due to its similarities with the 
previous Case 1, given that the growth rate for 2004 was only marginally revised. 
On the one hand, the updated Stability Programme includes a balanced budget 
target for 2003, based on the assumption of 3% real GDP growth. Trend GDP growth 
calculations, based on the application of the HP filter with ?=30, show a slight 
deceleration to 2.9% in 2003 and a fall in the output gap to 0.4%. This implies that 
the CAB would improve by 0.05 pp of GDP to -0.07% of GDP (see Table 2, first 
scenario). 
On the other hand, the European Commission assumed in its Spring forecast a 
less favourable macroeconomic scenario for 2003 (2% real GDP growth, 1 pp lower 
than projected in the Spanish updated programme) and a deficit 0.4% of GDP higher 
than planned by the Government (see Table 2, second scenario). 
No new discretionary measures were introduced between the presentation of the 
Stability Programme and the Commission Spring forecasts. Intuitively, given the 
estimate of the elasticity of the budget balance (as a percentage of GDP) to the cycle in 
Spain of 0.4, one might expect that this larger deficit would be fully explained by the 
more pessimistic growth scenario, while the CAB would remain unchanged from 
the SGP scenario. However, this is not the case. The revision of the GDP growth 
forecast generates a change in trend growth not only in the current year but also in 
previous and subsequent years and, consequently, in the output gap calculations. In 
particular, on the EC projections, trend GDP growth decreases by 0.1 pp on average 
during the 1990’s relative to the SGP projections. The output gap would, under this 
scenario, become negative in 2003 (and 0.43 pp lower than in the SGP scenario). This 
implies that the CAB is now 0.23% of GDP lower than estimated under the SGP, while 
the cyclical component deteriorates by only 0.17 pp of GDP. Thus, following the 
methodology described in Section 2, in this case the revision of the CAB is exclusively 
due to the revision of the GDP forecast and its impact on trend GDP (i.e. the DRC, 
measured by ??y*). 
TABLE 2. Impact of Forecast Revisions on Cyclically Adjusted Balances. 
Case Study: Spain 
GDP Trend GDP Output Gap Budget Balance (B) Cyclical comp. B CAB Change in CAB
Growth Growth (% of trend GDP) % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP
1999 4.20 3.26 0.81 -1.17 0.33 -1.50
2000 4.18 3.24 1.68 -0.78 0.68 -1.45 0.05
2001 2.67 3.14 1.17 -0.14 0.47 -0.62 0.83
2002 2.01 3.02 0.14 -0.07 0.06 -0.12 0.49
2003 2.95 2.93 0.12 -0.03 0.05 -0.07 0.05
GDP Trend GDP Output Gap Budget Balance (B) Cyclical comp. B CAB Change in CAB
Growth Growth (% of trend GDP) % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP
1999 4.20 3.20 0.89 -1.17 0.36 -1.53
2000 4.18 3.16 1.83 -0.78 0.74 -1.51 0.02
2001 2.67 3.03 1.44 -0.14 0.58 -0.72 0.79
2002 2.01 2.89 0.54 -0.07 0.22 -0.28 0.44
2003 1.95 2.78 -0.31 -0.43 -0.12 -0.30 -0.02
GDP Trend GDP Output Gap Budget Balance (B) Cyclical comp. B CAB Change in CAB
Growth Growth (% of trend GDP) % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP
1999 0.00 -0.05 0.07 0.00 0.03 -0.03
2000 0.00 -0.08 0.16 0.00 0.06 -0.06 -0.03
2001 0.00 -0.11 0.26 0.00 0.11 -0.11 -0.04
2002 0.00 -0.14 0.40 0.00 0.16 -0.16 -0.05
2003 -1.00 -0.15 -0.43 -0.40 -0.17 -0.23 -0.07
Scenario 1. 2002 Stability Programme
Scenario 2. European Commission Spring 2003 Forecast
Scenario 2 - Scenario 1
3.2. The effect of growth revisions between different forecast exercises by the 
European Commission 
We now estimate the impact of the more recent economic growth revisions on 
structural public balances in the euro area countries. In particular, we consider the last 
three forecast releases made by the European Commission (Autumn 2002, Spring 2003 
and Autumn 2003). In both the Autumn 2002 and the Spring 2003 releases the EC 
provides GDP projections for 2003 and 2004. In Autumn 2003 the projection period 
includes the year 2005. 
We use the methodology explained in this paper. The output gap is estimated 
using the HP filter (?=30) and GDP series are extended up to 2009. When comparing 
the Autumn 2002 and Spring 2003 releases we assume that, during the period 
2005-2009, GDP will grow at the same annual growth rate as potential output did 
in 2004, according to the Autumn 2003 release. Using the same growth rates in the 
extension period for both releases we reduce the impact derived from the method 
employed to extend the time series. When comparing the last two EC releases, Spring 
and Autumn 2003, we use the growth rate of potential GDP in the last available year 
(2004 in the Spring release and 2005 in the Autumn one) to extend the time series. It is 
important to note that in the Spring 2003 release there are also important revisions to 
the historical GDP growth rates for some countries. 
20
21
The upper panel in Table 3 shows the comparison of the Autumn 2002 and 
Spring 2003 releases, while the bottom panel presents the comparison between the 
Spring 2003 and Autumn 2003 releases. In both panels, the first set of columns shows 
the magnitude of the revisions to GDP growth between the two forecasting exercises. 
The next column presents the value of the assumed sensitivity of the cyclical budget 
balance to the output gap for each country [see European Commission (2002)]6. The 
third and fourth sets of columns show the implied revisions to CABs and to CAB annual 
changes due to the revision of the GDP trend. 
The revisions to GDP growth rates in the euro area countries in the 
Spring 2003 EC forecasts with respect to the previous Autumn 2002 release involve an 
average deterioration in structural deficits of 0.23%, 0.30% and 0.36% of GDP in 2003, 
2004 and 2005, respectively. The DRC is quite large in Finland (above 1% of GDP) and 
larger than 0.5% of GDP for some years in Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg. In 
terms of the changes in CABs the revisions are, however, much more limited in all 
countries, being below 0.12% of GDP and around 0.06% of GDP, on average, for the 
period 2003-2005. 
As far as the comparison between the Spring and Autumn 2003 releases is 
concerned, structural deficits increase, on average, by around 0.08%, 0.15% and 0.24% 
of GDP in 2003, 2004 and 2005, respectively, in the euro area countries due to GDP 
revisions. It should be taken into account that, in this case, historical data has also been 
revised significantly with a non-negligible impact on CABs. GDP revisions improve 
structural deficits in some countries (Greece, Spain, Luxembourg and Austria), while 
the DRC is negative in the rest of the countries and particularly large in the Netherlands 
(above 1% of GDP between 2002 and 2005) and in Ireland, Italy and Portugal 
(above 0.5% of GDP in some years). In terms of CAB changes, the revisions are, again, 
much more limited (around 0.07% of GDP on average), although, in some countries 
(see Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal), revisions to CAB changes are quite large 
(between 0.2 and 0.3% of GDP, approximately). 
                                               
6 Alternative values for budget sensitivity are provided in Bouthevillain (2001) and OECD (1999). 
TABLE 3. Impact of GDP revisions: Autumn and Spring EC forecasts 
Autumn 2002 vs Spring 2003 EC releases
year 2001 2002 2003 2004 ???(a) 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2002 2003 2004 2005
Belgium 0.0 -0.1 -0.9 -0.5 0.60 -0.20 -0.32 -0.44 -0.57 -0.68 -0.11 -0.13 -0.13 -0.11
Germany 0.0 -0.2 -1.0 -0.3 0.50 -0.19 -0.29 -0.40 -0.50 -0.59 -0.10 -0.11 -0.10 -0.09
Greece 0.0 0.5 -0.3 0.1 0.40 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Spain 0.0 0.1 -0.6 -0.2 0.40 -0.05 -0.09 -0.13 -0.16 -0.20 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03
France 0.0 0.2 -0.9 -0.4 0.40 -0.08 -0.14 -0.20 -0.27 -0.32 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
Ireland 0.0 2.7 -0.9 -0.7 0.35 0.26 0.34 0.39 0.41 0.42 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.01
Italy 0.0 -0.1 -0.8 -0.3 0.45 -0.01 -0.06 -0.12 -0.19 -0.25 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06
Luxembourg 0.0 0.2 -0.9 -0.7 0.60 -0.14 -0.24 -0.36 -0.48 -0.59 -0.10 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11
The Netherlands 0.0 0.1 -0.5 -0.5 0.65 -0.09 -0.16 -0.23 -0.32 -0.39 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08
Austria 0.0 0.3 -0.6 -0.3 0.30 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 -0.10 -0.13 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
Portugal 0.0 -0.3 -0.7 -0.5 0.35 0.01 -0.03 -0.10 -0.16 -0.22 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
Finland 0.0 0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.70 -0.82 -1.00 -1.17 -1.32 -1.44 -0.18 -0.17 -0.15 -0.12
average 0.0 0.3 -0.7 -0.4 0.48 -0.11 -0.16 -0.23 -0.30 -0.36 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06
Spring 2003 vs Autumn 2003 EC releases
year 2001 2002 2003 2004 ???(a) 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2002 2003 2004 2005
Belgium -0.1 0.0 -0.4 -0.5 0.60 -0.16 -0.20 -0.24 -0.26 -0.26 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.00
Germany 0.3 0.0 -0.4 -0.4 0.50 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.08 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02
Greece 0.0 -0.2 0.4 0.4 0.40 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.18 0.23 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
Spain 0.2 0.0 0.3 -0.2 0.40 0.08 0.13 0.18 0.25 0.32 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.08
France 0.3 0.1 -1.1 -0.6 0.40 -0.08 -0.15 -0.23 -0.31 -0.39 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07
Ireland 0.5 0.9 -1.8 -0.8 0.35 0.06 -0.06 -0.24 -0.49 -0.78 -0.12 -0.18 -0.24 -0.29
Italy 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.6 0.45 -0.11 -0.19 -0.29 -0.40 -0.53 -0.08 -0.10 -0.12 -0.12
Luxembourg 0.1 0.9 0.1 -0.8 0.60 0.95 1.08 1.15 1.18 1.16 0.13 0.08 0.02 -0.02
The Netherlands 0.0 -0.1 -1.4 -1.1 0.65 -0.31 -0.52 -0.78 -1.06 -1.33 -0.21 -0.26 -0.28 -0.27
Austria 0.1 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.30 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04
Portugal 0.0 0.0 -1.3 -1.1 0.35 -0.18 -0.31 -0.48 -0.66 -0.85 -0.13 -0.16 -0.18 -0.19
Finland 0.6 0.6 -0.8 -0.4 0.70 -0.04 -0.09 -0.17 -0.29 -0.45 -0.04 -0.08 -0.12 -0.15
average 0.1 0.2 -0.6 -0.5 0.48 0.02 -0.02 -0.08 -0.15 -0.24 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08
(a) European Commission (2002)
Note: the output gap is estimated using the HP-filter (?=30). GDP projections by the European Commission in Autumn 2002 are available up to 
2004. We extend them up to 2009 using the growth of potential GDP in 2004 (trend GDP for Luxembourg). For the Spring 2003 projections we 
use the same growth rates as in the Autum 2002 exercise for the extension period (2005-2009). 
Implied revision to the 
CHANGES in CABs
Revision to GDP growth 
rates (percentage points)
Implied revision to the LEVEL of 
CABs  (in precentage points)
Implied revision to the 
CHANGES in CABs
Note: the output gap is estimated using the HP-filter (?=30). GDP projections by the European Commission in Spring 2003 are available up to 
2004. The Autumn 2003 projections include 2005. In both cases we extend GDP up to 2009 using the growth of potential GDP (trend GDP for 
Luxembourg) for the last available year.
Revision to GDP growth 
rates (percentage points)
Implied revision to the LEVEL of 
CABs  (in precentage points)
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4. Conclusions 
The sluggish economic performance in most euro area countries has recently led 
to several successive downward revisions of GDP growth projections. At the same time, 
general government budget balances are also experiencing a considerable deterioration 
in both nominal and structural terms. Since these downward revisions to GDP growth 
projections across European countries should in principle be considered as a purely 
cyclical phenomenon, doubts emerge as to whether structural balances or CABs are 
being affected by a larger amount than can be explained on the basis of discretionary 
policies. This, in turn, is questioning the reliability of CAB estimates and their usefulness 
for policy decision-making and for the assessment of the medium-term fiscal objectives 
of EU Member States. 
This document presents a simple analysis, based on the estimation of structural 
balances using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, that leads to two main conclusions. Firstly, 
real GDP growth revisions affect both the GDP trend and output gap, and thus CABs, to 
a degree that depends on whether the revisions have a temporary or permanent effect 
on the GDP level. Transitory changes in the level of GDP are mainly allocated in the 
cyclical component and CAB levels are little affected. If, however, the revision implies a 
permanent change in the GDP level, CABs will be affected to a larger extent. Secondly, 
it is also shown that the impact of economic growth revisions on CAB changes is much 
more limited than on CAB levels. 
This implies that interpreting the results of cyclical adjustment is inherently not 
entirely free from ambiguity. There is some uncertainty surrounding these calculations 
which cannot be eliminated and which arises simply because the future itself is 
uncertain. Analysing what we have called the DRC, or the revision to CABs due to GDP 
revisions, is therefore a matter of interest, given the possibility that this factor could give 
rise to changing assessments of the public finance situation. 
When comparing the latest available data and projections of GDP up to 2004 by 
the European Commission we estimate that the increase in structural deficits in 2003 
due to the GDP revision between the Autumn 2002 and Spring 2003 and between the 
Spring and Autumn 2003 forecasting exercises amounts, respectively, to 0.23% 
and 0.08% of GDP on average for the euro area countries. The impact on CAB changes 
is much smaller but not negligible and averages 0.07% of GDP in both cases in 2003. 
Consequently, in the current context, the impact of downward revisions to economic 
growth is making the achievement of the CTBS fiscal position more difficult. However, 
these considerations are not so relevant to the achievement of the 0.5% annual 
improvement in CABs required of those countries failing to comply with the CTBS 
clause. 
The instability of CAB estimates when new information arrives is thus an 
argument justifying a certain degree of caution when compliance with the CTBS clause 
is being evaluated. Moreover, the uncertainty surrounding output gaps and CAB 
estimates should be recognised when ex-post compliance with the rules of the Stability 
Pact is being judged. This means that the part of the deterioration of CABs that is due 
to GDP revisions which, as this paper shows, can be easily calculated, should not be 
attributed to loosening fiscal policy actions, since the lack of compliance is the result of 
forces beyond the control of the government. This, however, does not mean that the 
effect of economic growth revisions on CABs should be ignored when fiscal policy 
actions are judged. It should be admitted that the underlying situation of public finances 
has indeed worsened and, consequently, even if it seems, in principle, that governments 
should not be blamed for an outcome which is not under their control, at some point the 
worsening in the CAB must be internalised by them when they draw up their fiscal plans. 
Failure to do so, after several successive rounds of downward revisions to growth, could 
give rise to a dangerous drift in the underlying fiscal position. 
A further important consideration relates to the fact that the incentives for 
governments to base the assessment of CAB developments on the CAB adjusted by 
the DRC are asymmetric over the business cycle. So far, our focus has been on an 
economic context of sluggish growth and downward revisions to economic prospects. In 
such a context, governments may have an incentive to push for an interpretation of CAB 
developments in which the DRC is disregarded (arguing that it is to be imputed to the 
cycle and not to discretionary actions). However, in a context in which GDP growth is 
revised upwards, the DRC will operate in the reverse direction, showing an improvement 
in CABs. In such circumstances, governments have an incentive to claim that this 
improvement is the result of their discretionary actions (instead of a consequence of the 
improvement in economic prospects, given the way in which the methodology for 
cyclical adjustment operates). This is basically what happened during 1999-2000, the 
period of positive growth surprises that preceded the current slowdown. At the time, 
governments were interpreting improvements in CABs as if they were entirely the result 
of discretionary action instead of being also partly the result of cyclical developments. 
Such an interpretation provided those governments with a seemingly large margin of 
manoeuvre to undertake tax cuts. Eventually, however, such margin proved not to be so 
large.  
This paper uses the Hodrick-Prescott filter as the methodology for analysing the 
effect of GDP growth revisions on trend output and CABs. However, this choice should 
not be used as an argument for rejecting this method of cyclical adjustment in favour of 
other alternatives. Indeed, any methodology for splitting economic series into their 
cyclical and trend components is subject to similar problems. Consequently, the use of 
alternative procedures to analyse CAB developments is also bound to involve 
shortcomings.
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